Philosophy 77 (3):375-405 (2002)

T. J. Mawson
Oxford University
This paper constitutes a suggested route through the well-trodden minefield that is Mill's proof of Utilitarianism. A deductive course—tramping gamely straight across from an egoistic psychological hedonism to a disinterested ethical hedonism—would seemingly be the most hazardous route across the terrain. Thus, it has become standard policy amongst guides to advise readers of Utilitarianism that this is a route which Mill neither needs nor attempts to take. I shall argue that in travelling down this route one can avoid the dangers with which it is usually associated and I shall tentatively suggest that one may find oneself following Mill's footsteps in doing so.
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DOI 10.1017/s0031819102000359
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Two Pessimisms in Mill.Joshua Fox - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (4):442-457.

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