Abstract

RESUMEN En el marco del debate sobre el ideal de ciencia libre de valores, Philip Kitcher propone un ideal de ciencia bien ordenada. La fundamentación política y meta-ética del ideal tiene dos versiones: la primera se inspira en el enfoque de John Rawls mientras que la segunda refiere a la idea de democracia como experiencia conjunta comunicada de John Dewey. El artículo sostiene que el planteo de Kitcher evidencia ciertas tensiones con la visión deweyana pues aquel mantiene una concepción formal de la democracia y una visión objetivista de sus valores estructurales -precisamente dos puntos que intentaba superar refiriendo a Dewey. ABSTRACT Within the general debate about free-value science ideal, Kitcher proposes a well-ordered science ideal. Its political as well as meta-ethical foundations present two different versions: the first is inspired by John Ralws' view whereas the second refers to John Dewey's idea of democracy as conjoint communicated experience. This article argues that Kitcher's view is not in tune with Dewey's but, on the contrary, it presents several tensions because it preserves a formal conception of democracy and an objectivistic view of values -precisely two points that Kitcher intended to avoid by quoting Dewey.