Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism [Book Review]

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128 (2014)
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In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.

Similar books and articles

Enacting is Enough.Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):24-30.


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Author's Profile

Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

Representation and mental representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
Embodied cognition.A. Wilson Robert & Foglia Lucia - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Enactivism and the Perception of Others’ Emotions.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):105-129.
The structure of intentionality. Insights and challenges for enactivism.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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