Three pseudo-paradoxes in?quantum? decision theory: Apparent effects of observation on probability and utility

Theory and Decision 35 (1):55-73 (1993)
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Lou Marinoff
City College of New York (CUNY)

Citations of this work

A resolution of Bertrand's paradox.Louis Marinoff - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):1-24.
Two envelopes.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (1):69-96.
A reply to Rapoport.L. Marinoff - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (2):157-164.
Effects of information on assessment of probabilities.A. Rapoport - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (2):149-155.

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References found in this work

Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (2):295-298.
Re-encountering a counter-intuitive probability.Roger J. Faber - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (2):283-285.
Countering a counter-intuitive probability.Lynn E. Rose - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (4):523-524.

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