The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?

Noûs 41 (4):561-593 (2007)
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Abstract

What is a concept? Philosophers have given many different answers to this question, reflecting a wide variety of approaches to the study of mind and language. Nonetheless, at the most general level, there are two dominant frameworks in contemporary philosophy. One proposes that concepts are mental representations, while the other proposes that they are abstract objects. This paper looks at the differences between these two approaches, the prospects for combining them, and the issues that are involved in the dispute. We argue that powerful motivations have been offered in support of both frameworks. This suggests the possibility of combining the two. Unlike Frege, we hold that the resulting position is perfectly coherent and well worth considering. Nonetheless, we argue that it should be rejected along with the view that concepts are abstract objects.

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Author Profiles

Eric Margolis
University of British Columbia
Stephen Laurence
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Publicity of Thought.Andrea Onofri - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272).

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