The Multi-Perspectival Theory of Knowledge

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):97-112 (1980)
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Abstract

Epistemology aims to understand the concept of knowledge. To understand what knowledge is it is necessary to understand what justified belief is. This is not because justified belief is necessary for knowledge in every case; I consider cases of knowledge without justified belief later. But in most cases of knowledge, justified belief is necessary for knowledge. The concept or concepts of justification focus the interest of epistemologists. The other components of knowledge, which include at least true belief, are investigated in general metaphysics and in philosophy of mind. Further, our only approach to truth in our beliefs is through justified believing. These considerations underscore the peculiarity of some recent developments in epistemology. Reflection on Gettier examples, examples of social factors influencing knowledge, and examples of discriminative capacities influencing knowledge have led some epistemologists to turn away from concepts of justification and toward concepts of reliability, discrimination among relevant alternatives, and optimal explanation. [...] I shall offer an account of knowledge, the multi-perspectival account, in which most any traditional concept of justification can be employed, but which relates justification to knowledge in a more illuminating way than a typical justified, true belief approach does...

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