Truth, Meaning, and Yablo’s Paradox – A Moderate Anti-Realist Approach

Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1):101-111 (2020)
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Abstract

Yablo’s Paradox, an infinite-sentence version of the Liar Paradox, aims to show that semantic paradox can emerge even without circularity. I will argue that the lack of meaning/content of the sentences involved is the source of the paradoxical outcome.I will introduce and argue for a Moderate Antirealist approach to truth and meaning, built around the twin principles that neither truth nor meaning can outstrip knowability. Accordingly, I will introduce a MAR truth operator that both forges an explicit connection between truth and knowability and distinguishes between truth and factuality. I will also argue that the meaning/content of propositions should be identified not with the set of possible worlds in which the propositions are true/factual, but rather in which they are known.I will show that our MAR framework dissolves Yablo’s Paradox and also confirms our intuition that these sentences are all devoid of content/meaning.

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