Easy Ontology, quantification, and realism

Synthese 198 (7):6281-6295 (2019)
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Abstract

Amie Thomasson has defended a view called Easy Ontology, according to which most ontological questions can be answered straightforwardly using conceptual truths and empirical knowledge. Furthermore, she claims that this deflationary meta-ontology does not commit her to any form of anti-realism. In this paper I identify a problem with Thomasson’s account of quantification, according to which everything we quantify over falls under a sortal. Thomasson’s defence of the easiness of answering ontological questions relies on a certain thesis about the hierarchical order of sortals, but the case for the compatibility of Easy Ontology and realism suggests that this thesis is actually false.

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Benjamin Marschall
Cambridge University

References found in this work

Ontology Made Easy.Amie Lynn Thomasson - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.
Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.
The things we mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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