Abstract

Due to arguments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge it is generally, although not universally, held that the content of a mental state depends not on facts about the individual in isolation, but on the relationship that the individual has to his or her environment. It has been observed that this position, "externalism," has strong consequences for theories of self-knowledge, for if the contents of our mental states are determined by external factors, then we could hardly be said to have authoritative self-knowledge. The dissertation explores the consequences of externalism for self-knowledge. Taking a leaf from Hegel's arguments in the Science of Logic and the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that self-knowledge cannot be direct and immediate, but rather is mediated and requires investigation. I then go on to show some of the implications of this externalist theory of self-knowledge, including those for a theory of the self and Cartesian skepticism as well as certain social and political consequences