Abstract
This article replies to Lynne Rudder Baker and Gareth B. Matthews’s “Anselm’s Argument Reconsidered,” in which the authors claim to have produced a sound version of Anselm’s ontological argument. Using Gaunilo’s “lost island” counterexample, this article explores the question whether an Anselmian argument can prove the existence of the greatest conceivable being without relying on premises that also prove the existence of the greatest conceivable island. A premise crucial to any such argument is a “greatness principle,” about which there has recently been scholarly disagreement. This article examines two versions: (GP′) If it is in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater, and (GP*) If it exists in the understanding alone, that which is greater can be conceived to exist in reality also. A distinctive feature of Baker and Matthews’s approach is that it countenances some “objects of thought” that not only do not exist in reality but logically cannot exist in reality. They then argue that for any conceivable island, a greater island is conceivable, but that there cannot be a conceivable being greater than the greatest conceivable being. Their strategy is vulnerable on two counts. It does not address the possibility that there is no upper limit to greatness in conceivable beings. Nor does it assure us that the greatest conceivable being is even logically possible. Thus their version of Anselm’s argument is inconclusive.