A Counterexample to Huemer's ’No Matter What’ Interpretation of the Consequence Argument

Abstract

The consequence argument is a salient argument in favor of incompatibilism which is the thesis that if determinism is true, then it is not the case that we have free will. In a nutshell, the consequence argument has it that if determinism is true, then our acts are determined by the laws of nature and events of the past. But we are neither able to change the past nor the laws of nature. Therefore, we are not able to change the consequences of them. This short paper consists of two main sections. In the first section, I will explain the consequence argument and rule β. In addition, in the second section of the paper, I will introduce the no matter what interpretation which was suggested by Huemer (2000). Moreover, I will offer a counterexample to rule β∗ and α∗

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Mansooreh (Sophia) Kimiagari
University of Calgary

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