Some Explanatory Issues with Woodward’s Notion of Intervention

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):299-315 (2023)
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Abstract

James Woodward’s manipulationist counterfactual theory of explanation offers strong tools for an adequate approach to explanation endeavours. One of these tools is the notion of intervention, which serves as a guiding principle for identifying explanations as causal, thus preserving the unidirectionality of explanatory praxis. Nevertheless, in this paper, I argue that in some cases of explanation, this notion has a rather redundant role since it is either impossible to define or it can be replaced by other types of manipulations or both. I shall show these shortcomings of intervention in two particularly detailed analyses of an economic example pertaining to Okun’s law and the pendulum explanation. In analysing the former example, I contend that given the complex causal situation of economic phenomena, the notion of intervention is inept at helping explain them. In the latter example, I show that the notion of intervention is readily replaceable by other types of variation—conceptual or mathematical. Finally, I shall end this article by examining the case of pendulum explanation in light of Woodward’s new approach to explanation direction. In the end, the conclusion is that the variables of the pendulum law are in a symmetrical relationship.

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References found in this work

Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Mathematics and Scientific Representation.Christopher Pincock - 2012 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Causal explanation.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers Vol. Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 214-240.
Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon & Anne Fagot-Largeault - 1989 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):355.

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