Can vagueness cut out at any order?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):499 – 508 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Could a sentence be, say, 3rd order vague, but 4th order precise? In Williamson 1999 we find an argument that seems to show that this is impossible: every sentence is either 1st order precise, 2nd order precise, or infinitely vague. The argument for this claim is unpersuasive, however, and this paper explains why.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
158 (#117,536)

6 months
17 (#142,329)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Supervaluationism and good reasoning.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3):521-537.
How vagueness could cut out at any order.Cian Dorr - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-10.
VIII—Vagueness at Every Order.Andrew Bacon - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):165-201.
II—Modelling Higher-Order Vagueness: Columns, Borderlines and Boundaries.Rosanna Keefe - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):89-108.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references