Robot pains and corporate feelings

The Philosophers' Magazine 52:78-82 (2011)
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Abstract

Most philosophers of mind follow Thomas Nagel and hold that subjective experiences are characterised by the fact that there is “something it is like” to have them. Philosophers of mind have sometimes speculated that ordinary people endorse, perhaps implicitly, this conception of subjective experiences. Some recent findings cast doubt on this view.

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Author Profiles

Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington

Citations of this work

Experimental Philosophy of Pain.Justin Sytsma & Kevin Reuter - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):611-628.
Revisiting the Valence Account.Justin Sytsma - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):179-198.

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