Abstract

The idea that consequentialism provides agents with a decision procedure for guiding them to a justified course of action is very much out of vogue. In this essay I resuscitate this idea, first by scaling down our expectations of it, and then by showing that criticism of consequentialism that maintain that the theory, understood as providing a decision procedure, threaten the integrity of agents' lives can be met without abandoning this idea. I defend an account of a consequentialist decision procedure--identity-friendly long-term egalitarian consequentialism--that is neither alienating nor overly demanding. It is not alienating because on its abstract consequentialist goals take on an identity shaped by agent's particular interests and commitments. The account rests on the premise that the demands of such a view should be informed by a detailed understanding of our moral motivational complexities. To this end I construct a model of moral identity which I use to develop the notion of an individual's moral capacity. By shaping the demandingness of my interpretation in light of this concept my account avoids being overly demanding. Appealing again to my model, I then argue that traditional forms of consequentialism which regard the impersonal perspective as the sole moral perspective are inferior to forms of the theory which also recognize the moral standing of more personal points of view. After explaining why the egalitarian interpretation of consequentialism I favour is not committed to the traditional view, I explain how it can be revised to accommodate both personal and impersonal moral perspectives and remain a form of consequentialism