Abstract

Na primerih Bergsonove in Freudove teorije smeha pričujoča razprava odkriva, da, četudi stojita na nasprotnih polih glede razporeditve načel pri subjektu in objektu smeha – pri Bergsonu se razumni, brezčutni in samorefleksivni predstavnik življenja družbe smeji nezavednemu, afektiranemu posamezniku, pri Freudu pa se nezavedna, družbeno rušilna tendenca posameznika smeji togi inhibiciji družbe – oba sovpadata pri ločitvi subjekta in objekta smeha, s čimer sam smeh tudi zvajata na korelat resne izjave subjekta, ki potrjuje centralno točko njunih teorij in zanika njegovega drugega v objektu . Preko Bahtinove teorije je prikazana možnost sovpadanja smešnega in smejočega v kolektivizaciji subjekta smeha in univerzalizaciji njegovega objekta.Smešno se zdaj kaže kot desublimacija centralnega pojma resnega, ki ga pripelje v konjunkcijo z lastnim nasprotjem. Smešni junak je vedno resen, še preveč, saj sega naravnost po centralnem objektu svoje resnosti, s čimer pa ga ravno desublimira in izpostavi konjunkciji z nasprotjem. Komični junak je prikazan kot narcis, ki pokaže lulka in ga izpostavlja kastraciji. Tudi sama kastracija pa je v smešnem ambivalentna. Tekst tako končuje s pozivom k premaganju strahu pred resnostjo in izpostavljanju smehu.Comparing Bergson's and Freud's theories of laughter, the essay reveals that, despite their contrary positions in distributing attributes between the subject and object of laughter, Bergson's rational, dispassionate and self-conscious representative of life/society laughs at the unconscious, passionate individual, while Freud has the unconscious, socially disrupting tendency of the individual laughing at the inert inhibitions of society. They both conform to the division between subject and object, enabling them to refer laughter to a form of serious statement on behalf of the object in the effect of confirming the central notion of their respective theories and denying its other in the mocked object . Bachtin's theory reveals the possibility of converging the subject and object of laughter by making the former collective and the latter universal. The funny now appears as the desublimation of the central concept of the serious, bringing it into conjunction with its opposite. The comic hero is always serious, even too much so, for he always tends to reach straight for the central object of his serious engagement, desubliming it and facing it with its contrary. The comic hero as the narcissus reveals his will to castration. But within the funny, even castration is ambivalent. The text thus ends with a call to overcoming the fear of being earnest and exposing oneself to laughter