Abstract

In chapter one, I motivate the results to follow by discussing their impact on our conception of the nature of philosophy. ;In chapter two, I define, by way of a description of its rules of inference, a system of quantified modal logic. I then use this system in subsequent chapters to codify definitions of concepts and to construct formal derivations. ;Chapter three considers an essay by Nasser and Brown in which they attempt to answer our basic question: does an omniscient being exist? I also evaluate their claim to be addressing an argument by Hartshorne . ;In chapter four I distinguish four traditional concepts of omniscience. Each is defined in terms of the formal system of chapter two, making use of only non-logical predicate, the dyadic relation 'x knows that p'. I then define adequacy conditions and prove that the definitions given meet them. ;In chapter five, I construct valid derivations of the existence of an omniscient being . ;In chapter six, I consider the premisses used in the Seven Epistemic Ways, and show that, with the exception of the premise that it is possible that there be an omniscient being, each of these premisses is a theorem when omniscience is construed as in the classical tradition . ;In chapter seven alternatives to the classical concepts of omniscience are defined formally . I then show which of the seven ways are sound when the premisses are interpreted in terms of these alternative concepts