Abstract

The contemporary debate on justice is understandably dominated by theories and arguments addressing the problems of justice pertinent to nearly just societies, as virtually all the theorists participating in this debate live in such societies. They are obviously, and rightly so, first and foremost concerned with the philosophical problems of their own societies. Although almost all the contemporary theories of justice were formulated in the context of nearly just societies, why can we not apply them to the issues and problems of radically unjust societies? The view that such a move is permissible and wise is at present no more than an unexamined assumption, an unargued view. Such an unargued view leads to the suspicion that a strong case may be made that radically unjust societies generate problems of social and political justice that should be considered in their own right. This does not imply that theories of justice developed in the context of, and aimed at, those issues current in nearly just societies should be disregarded or discarded. What is required are arguments to indicate to what extent the theoretical insights and wisdom contained in these theories can be utilized in a discussion of the social and political problems of radically unjust societies. I argue for the view that the contemporary debate on justice contains a major deficiency. In this article, I attempt to specify this major deficiency, namely that exclusive attention is given to the problems of nearly just societies while the problems of radically unjust societies are mostly ignored. The strategy will be to raise issues pertinent to radically unjust societies and note the extent to which clear and unambiguous solutions could be provided by participants in the contemporary debate on justice.