In Defence of the Proportionality Principle

Australasian Philosophical Review 6 (2):189-195 (2022)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove argues against the proportionality principle that it cannot accommodate important phenomena of our moral practice, namely forgiveness, love, and ambition: each of the cases involve pro- or contra-attitudes that are disproportionate to the intrinsic value or disvalue of their object. In this commentary, I offer alternative interpretations of forgiveness, love, and ambition and show that each of these phenomena is in line with the proportionality principle.

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Jörg Löschke
University of Zürich

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References found in this work

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
Value, reality, and desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - New York: Clarendon Press.
Love as valuing a relationship.Niko Kolodny - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.
What Virtue Adds to Value.Glen Pettigrove - 2022 - Australasian Philosophical Review 6 (2):113-128.

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