Abstract

Rage has a bad reputation. When we think of rage, we think of a hot, violent and all-consuming fury. That’s how philosophy sees rage, at least—philosophical tradition insists that anger comes attached with a desire of retaliation that seeks the pain of offenders in order to compensate for the pain that has been inflicted onto victims. For that reason, rage is, more often than not, discouraged in favor of forgiveness or any other more ‘positive’ emotion. Even in arguments that attempt to redeem anger, such as those found in Myisha Cherry’s “The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle,” anger’s redemption comes stipulations: for Cherry, anger must be instrumentally valuable to social movements. This thesis sees rage as more than both of these conceptualizations: rage is not revenge-centered nor does it need to assist a grander movement in order to be valuable—rage is valuable within itself. This thesis contends that rage is advantageous to the individual that feels it on the basis that it reveals and affirms hurt, restores dignity, and can prevent transgressions from recurring. This thesis does not just defend rage–it recommends it.