Scope fallacies and the “decisive objection” against endurance

Philosophia 34 (4):441-452 (2006)
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Abstract

From time to time, the idea that enduring things can change has been challenged. The latest challenge has come in the form of what David Lewis has called a “decisive objection”, which claims to deduce a contradiction from the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, when that idea is combined with eternalism. It is my aim in this paper to explain why I think that no argument has yet appeared that deduces a contradiction from a combination of eternalism and the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, except ones that do so by committing scope fallacies.

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Lawrence Lombard
Wayne State University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.

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