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Reliability in mathematical physics
Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-21 (1993)
Abstract
In this paper I argue three things: (1) that the interactionist view underlying Benacerraf's (1973) challenge to mathematical beliefs renders inexplicable the reliability of most of our beliefs in physics; (2) that examples from mathematical physics suggest that we should view reliability differently; and (3) that abstract mathematical considerations are indispensable to explanations of the reliability of our beliefs.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
On Tins and Tin-Openers.Michael Liston - 2011 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 151--160.
References found in this work
What is Mathematical Truth?Hilary Putnam - 1979 - In Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 60--78.
Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times.M. Kline - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):68-87.
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