On counter-intuitive science

Abstract

Non-intuitive ideas in science, such as the constancy of the speed of light in all reference frames or the hierarchy of transfinites, are always based on elementary observations and primitive notions which in some sense are considered to be self-evident. In all examples of non-intuitive concepts, a decision has been made to consider certain elementary observations more self-evident than others. If one inverts this order, the non-intuitive concept is replaced by another thus creating what may be called a dual image of science. In certain cases, the paradigm of image/dual-image may be a more adequate representation of physical reality than the postulation of either one of them alone.

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Roy Lisker
Wesleyan University

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