Three Scenarios Undermining the Predictability of Mind

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to undermine or even refute the notion of predictability, especially the predictability of mind by examining three scenarios presupposing predictability. The first scenario is developed by Stefan Rummens and Stefaan E. Cuypers whose aim was to show that the general notion of predictability is self-defeating by indicating that there is a paradox in this scenario. I will point out that some restrictions must be made for the paradox to hold. By analyzing the second scenario, I will introduce my own argument to show that, if actualized, the predictability of mind would contradict two common senses about knowledge. The third scenario will show that, if actualized, predictability of mind would yield some oddity. I will also discuss how the predictability of mind would meet the problem of individuating thoughts.

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Abraham Lim
University of Cologne

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