Abstract

The “Asian disease” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) demonstrated behaviour in contradiction to the invariance axiom of EU theory. However, the risky choice behaviour was simply seen by the equate-to-differentiate model as a choice between the best possible outcomes or a choice between the worst possible outcomes. It was then argued that a way in which frame influences choice is through the perceived difference between possible outcomes. A “judgement” task was designed to examine whether the knowledge of “the value difference between each possible outcome and the certain outcome” will permit prediction of preference in the choice pattern related to the Asian disease problem. Participants were exposed to an anthrax disease problem (the original or probabilistic version of the Asian disease problem) and a SARS problem (the fuzzy version of the Asian disease problem). It was shown that the empirical evidence in relation to the Asian disease problem could be satisfactorily accounted for by the generalised weak dominance strategy revealed by the judgement results.