Scientific progress and the Fregean legacy

Mind and Language 14 (3):263–290 (1999)
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Abstract

Twentieth century philosophy of science has been dominated by a view of language with a strong prejudice against psychology, even while empirical psychology has moved away from the nineteenth century philosophical psychology against which the prejudice was originally directed. This legacy is shown to dominate even in recent Kripke‐inspired efforts toward new theories of meaning. Its influence is argued to undermine prospects for making sense of such phenomena as scientific progress. Avoiding this consequence requires that we pursue a psychologically informed theory of meaning.

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Alex Levine
University of South Florida

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