Abstract

The following essay outlines the principal arguments presented by the sceptical tradition, from its explicit beginnings in Greek philosophy down to a variety of contemporary forms of scepticism. The discussion takes its point of departure from an analysis of the original sceptical tropes that were directed against the “Dogmatists,” focussing particularly on the “Modes” of Aenesidemus and Agrippa. The principal part of the essay is dedicated to an elucidation of the nature and status of “beliefs” with a view to comparing ancient, modern, and contemporary types of scepticism. Far from re-endorsing the ideal of a life without beliefs as a model for human happiness, modern and contemporary varieties of scepticism offer a description of human historical experience that is indeed based on beliefs. From this point onwards, the actual power of scepticism – represented by a lineage that includes Montaigne, Hume, Goodman, and Primo Levi – derives from its attempt to combine two perspectives that appear formally incompatible with one another: (i) the desire for a permanent order of things in the context of a predictable and meaningful shared world, and (ii) a profound admiration for the human variety that is enshrined in different acts and kinds of belief