Abstract

I proceed by examining the versions of foundationalism advanced by C. I. Lewis and Roderick Chisholm. In presenting their views, Lewis and Chisholm have attempted to give answers to three fundamental questions: Why must the structure of empirical knowledge be foundational? What is the nature of the foundation of knowledge? and How does the foundation serve as the justification of nonfoundational beliefs? Their answers to these questions are the subject of examination in this dissertation. ;Foundationalism may be characterized as the theory whose central tenets are: Some empirical beliefs have at least some degree of initial epistemic justification which is independent of the justification that they may derive from other beliefs; and All empirical beliefs must ultimately derive at least some of their justification from beliefs that are self-justified, i.e., beliefs that satisfy . In this dissertation, I will attempt to show that some theory which affirms both of the foregoing theses is tenable. I will demonstrate the tenability of foundationalism by examining the most influential versions of the theory, and by attempting to show how the defects of these versions of the theory could be eliminated and how the conflicts between the different versions could be resolved