The Strict and Broad Views of Intention Again

The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 22 (3):479-494 (2022)
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Abstract

I reply to Steven Jensen’s article, “Phoenix Rising from the Ashes: Recent Attempts to Revive New Natural Law Action Theory,” which appeared in this journal in 2020. His arguments helpfully clarify where the disagreements between the strict and broad views of intention lie but, I argue, fail to refute the arguments and explanations he criticizes. I argue he misinterprets the strict view’s reference to necessity in its criterion for what is intended. I also argue against what he labels as the “identity thesis,” and against his attempt to show that the strict view (or New Natural Law theory of action) leads to the absurdity that most acts of adultery are not actually adultery.

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Patrick Lee
Franciscan University of Steubenville

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