Hitchcock and Sober on Weak Predictivism

Philosophia 40 (3):553-562 (2012)
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Abstract

According to Hitchcock and Sober’s argument from overfitting for weak predictivism, the fact that a theory accurately predicts a portion of its data is evidence that it has been formulated by balancing simplicity and goodness-of-fit rather than overfitting data. The core argument consists of two likelihood inequalities. In this paper I show that there is a surprising accommodation-friendly implication in their argument, and contend that it is beset by a substantial difficulty, namely, there is no good reason to think that their second likelihood inequality is true

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Wang-Yen Lee
National University of Singapore

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References found in this work

Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Conjectures and Refutations.Karl Popper - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.
Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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