Abstract

This dissertation is about criminal attempts in the Anglo-American common law tradition although aspects of the subject as treated in the Continental civil law tradition are considered where necessary. Three main problems are dealt with. It is traditionally thought that in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence mere preparation to commit a crime does not constitute an attempt to commit the crime hence it is non-criminal. This legal thesis is rejected. I argue that given the raisons d'etre of punishing attempts any act done with the intention of committing a substantive crime ought to constitute an attempt to commit the crime hence punishable. The actus may be perfectly innocent but becomes reus by virtue of the mens rea which is attached to it. This, I argue, the would-be criminal by engaging in an act preparatory to the commission of a particular crime shows a dangerous deposition and he ought to be punished for reasons of individual and general deferrence. The legal distinction that is commonly drawn between preparation and attempt is, therefore, criticized and it is urged that the distinction ought to be eliminated. ;I also argue that with respect to the doctrine of impossibility in criminal attempts, the distinction that is so often drawn between "legal" and "factual" impossibility is a silly distinction which ought to be abolished; and, furthermore, the whole doctrine of impossibility ought to be eliminated. The standard that ought to be used in assessing criminal liability in cases involving attempts to commit crimes which are impossible to commit is the Subjective Standard. Thus, the objectivist approach to liability is rejected. ;On the question of quantum of punishment the submission is made that the almost universal practice of punishing criminal attempts less severely than completed crimes is not based on any rational foundation hence unjustified both in law and morality. It is argued that on the basis of moral blameworthiness and dangerousness, and the irrelevancy of luck in assessments of moral guilt, criminal attempts ought to be punished as severely as completed cases. The line of argument employed in the entire dissertation is utilitarian