Dispositions and Modalities

In Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.), Science & reason. New York: Oxford University Press (1990)
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Abstract

Probabilistic connections are simple to reproduce counterfactually or hypothetically, since this involves simply adding the required statements to our evidential corpus without worrying about erasing some statements. In the serious uniform causal connections' case, the problem is complicated by the fact that some erasures will almost always have to be made, and that leads to the problems of intention and vagueness. On the other hand, uniform causal connections, considered both counterfactually and hypothetically, are exactly the connections needed to be taken into account in life. Finally, however, some dispositions can be no more than hard facts.

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