Bireyleşimin Önselliği

Felsefe Arkivi 51:411-421 (2019)
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Abstract

It has been thought that statements in ordinary language or in philosophicalscientific language capture reality from different sides. But this process, which is typically considered to be a mere linguistic process, can cause us to think (incorrectly) that we make subjective categorizations. In this paper we assert that understanding which is considered to be incorrect must be cancelled and that the individuated objects cannot be individuated only becouse of our naming of them. Individuation of objects is an independent state of affairs. So it must be accepted that the particular, individual entities have their individual characteristics independently and also a different ontological theory based on that understanding must be satisfied.

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