Abstract
§1. Introduction. When truth-theoretic paradoxes are generated, two factors seem to be at play: the behaviour that truth intuitively has; and the facts about which singular terms refer to which sentences, and so on. For example, paradoxicality might be partially attributed to the contingent fact that the singular term, "the italicized sentence on page one", refers to the sentence, The italicized sentence on page one is not true. Factors of this second kind might be represented by a ground model: an interpretation of all the names, function symbols, and predicates in the potentially self-referential language under study, with the exception of the predicate "x is true". Formally, suppose that L is an uninterpreted first order language. M = 〈D, I〉 is a classical model for L if D is a nonempty set; and I is a function assigning to each name of L a member of D, to each n-place function symbol of L a function from Dn to D, and to each nonlogical n-place predicate of L a function from Dn to {t, f}. Suppose furthermore that L+ is obtained by adding a new one-place predicate T to L, and that L has a quote name ‘A’ for each sentence A of L+. We follow Gupta and Belnap [5] in defining S =df {A: A is a sentences of L+}. A classical model M = 〈D, I〉 for L is a ground model for L iff both S ⊆ D, and I(‘A’) = A for each A ∈ S. A classical ground model for L is a representation of the supposedly unproblematic fragment of L+: a representation of which terms refer to which objects, and of which objects have which nonsemantic properties.