Nietzsche’s Immoral Ontology

Phainomena 37 (2001)
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Abstract

This study presents Nietzsche’s criticism of morals as a criticism of thinking which refuses to be an “interpretation”. While moral thinking tries to rid human being of “interpretative” character, Nietzsche shows that this character is true not only of humans, but of all beings — of being as such. There is nothing which can exist only in itself, constituting its own meaning. Every thing exists as a perspective, as a relation to other things. The fundamental ontological notions thus appear as a relationship of potentiality, where one can become the other. Heidegger interprets, the non-human sphere of being not on the basis of the structure of understanding itself, but on the basis of its difference from the structure of understanding . Nietzsche might argue that this is another expression of the moral, not interpreting being-in-the-world, but seeking pure being itself

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Pavel Kouba
Charles University, Prague

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