Political Obligations and Respect for Social Norms

Analyse & Kritik 46 (1):37-50 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper examines Laura Valentini’s attempt to explain political obligations through her account of social norms, her ‘Agency-Respect View’ (ARV). A great strength of ARV is preserving the ‘content-independence’ of political obligations. However, ARV does not mesh well with the moral phenomenology of political obligations. ARV is able to generate moral requirements that are strikingly weak. Accounting for the far stronger moral force of requirements to obey the law requires appealing to law-independent considerations. Valentini’s account of these factors suggests greater explanatory force of an alternative view she dismisses, to which she refers as the ‘deflationary view.’ In addition, among alternative theories that Valentini rejects is one based on the principle of fair play. I respond to Valentini’s criticisms, thereby demonstrating the continuing applicability of fair play.

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2024-05-27

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Are there any natural rights?H. L. A. Hart - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (2):175-191.
The Authority of the State.Leslie Green - 1988 - Philosophy 64 (250):566-567.

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