How the Laws of Physics Don't Even Fib

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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:33-41 (1986)
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Abstract

The most recent challenge to the covering-law model of explanation charges that the fundamental explanatory laws are not true. In fact explanation and truth are alleged to pull in different directions. We hold that this gets its force from confusing issues about the truth of the laws in the explanation and the precision with which those laws can yield an exact description of the event to be explained. In defending this we look at Cartwright's major case studies and sketch an amended covering-law model of explanation.

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Carl Alan Matheson
University of Manitoba

Citations of this work

Laws and models in a theory of idealization.Chuang Liu - 2004 - Synthese 138 (3):363 - 385.
How Nancy Cartwright tells the truth.Allan Franklin - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):527-529.

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