Abstract

The author applies reformed epistemology supplemented by some ideas from evolutionary cognitive science to consider the problem of justification of belief in the God of revelation. He argues that since our cognitive faculties are the result of evolution by natural selection, we have strong reasons for supposing that those spheres of reality which bore neither direct nor indirect relations to the survival needs of our ancestors lie outside our natural knowledge. If there is a certain mighty and benevolent agent, that is, God, which belongs to this unknowable reality, we can expect that he would not leave us ignorant of his existence, even if we are not able to learn about him by ourselves. It could be supposed that God, in order to make us believe in Him, uses the conjunctions of natural circumstances foreseen by Him, in addition to the revelation given in a supernatural way. Therefore, if God exists and one believes in Him, one's religious belief is a product of reliable belief-forming processes installed by God. So, this belief could be regarded as warranted even without appropriate evidences.