Two kinds of theory-laden cognitive processes: Distinguishing intransigence from dogmatism

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):218-219 (2013)
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Abstract

The brain is involved in theory-laden cognitive processes. But there are two different theory-laden processes. In cases where the theory is based on facts, more facts can either falsify or confirm a theory. In cases where the theory is about the choice of a benchmark or a standard, more facts can only make a theory either more or less warranted. Clark offers a review of a view of the brain where the brain pro- cesses input information in a way that confirms its priors or its pre- dictions. This does not mean that the brain creates its own reality. The brain, rather, processes input data, but it does so in light of its own priors. The brain is a bidirectional hierarchical structure. While the top layers generate priors, the lower layers process input data. The brain amounts to the dynamics of image- making, where the top-down process generates unified images, while the bottom-up process, which takes data, corrects the images.

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