The Forfeiture Theory of Punishment: Surviving Boonin’s Objections

Public Affairs Quarterly 24 (4):319-334 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper, I set out a version of the Forfeiture Theory of Punishment. Forfeiture Theory: Legal punishment is just or permissible because offenders forfeit their rights.On this account, offenders forfeit their rights because they infringed on someone’s rights. My strategy is to provide a version of the Forfeiture Theory and then to argue that it survives a number of initially intuitive seeming objections, most having their origins in the recent work of David Boonin.

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Stephen Kershnar
Fredonia State University

Citations of this work

Punishment, Consent and Value.David Alm - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):903-914.

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