Getting to the Truth Through Conceptual Revolutions

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):89-96 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

[I]t would be absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object than belongs to the possible experience of it or lay claim to the least knowledge of how anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience is determined according to the constitution that it has in itself.* * *It would be… a still greater absurdity if we conceded no things in themselves or declared our experience to be the only possible mode of knowing things….[Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics]A certain line of skepticism about normative epistemology has become more or less standard in contemporary philosophy of science. It runs like this.Scientific method is a matter of choosing among theories on the basis of evidence.But in “conceptual revolutions”, meaning, truth, and even what counts as observable can all be theory-relative.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-30

Downloads
5 (#1,562,182)

6 months
3 (#1,045,901)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Clark Glymour
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Philosophy 56 (217):427-429.

Add more references