Abstract

Narrative psychology claims that autobiographical, verbal narratives are crucial for constructing our selves. In philosophy, Daniel Dennett posits that the Self is a result of narrative activity. The former hardly explains how verbal, autobiographical narratives cause a felt, continuous Self via the psychological world of the human being in direct way. The latter’s assumption is that Self is only an abstraction, it does not really exist, but it would have to explain how having a Self can be felt, if it is only a fiction. In my suggestion, the conceptualization hypothesis of the embodied cognition movement can help solve these problems. This hypothesis is combinable with the narrative theory of self, but it claims that if language and thinking is embodied, then verbal narratives must be embodied too. In this approach, narratives come from the organism-environment interaction, and later these narratives as small, bodily stories can assist thinking and give structural basis to understand verbal narratives.