In Defence of Singular Propositions

In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos. pp. 197-214 (2011)
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Abstract

In the paper I make an attempt to preserve Singular Propositions from the attack carried out by Jason Stanley. Stanley argues that propositions, in general, are not the bearers of modal properties, and thus he refutes one of the major arguments in favour of singular propositions (offered by David Kaplan). My aim is to show that Stanley’s reasoning is fallacious​ since the Expression-Communication Principle which is the basis for his argument suffers from being circular. In brief, a deeper insight into Stanley’s theory called Indexicalism reveals that according to the Principle two sentences express the same proposition when they... express the same proposition.

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Filip Kawczyński
University of Warsaw

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