Emotion, representation, and consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):204-205 (2000)

Abstract

Rolls's preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative restriction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, display behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by themselves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required.

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Leonard David Katz
Harvard University

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