Analyticity, necessity, and the epistemology of semantics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):1-28 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Contemporary philosophy standardly accepts Frege's conceptions of sense as the determiner of reference and of analyticity as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning. This paper argues that those conceptions are mistaken. It develops referentially autonomous notions of sense and analyticity and applies them to the semantics of natural kind terms. The arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke concerning natural kind terms are widely taken to refute internalist and rationalist theories of meaning. This paper shows that the counter-intuitive consequences about the reference of natural kind terms depend as much on Frege's conceptions of sense and analyticity as on what such theories of meaning say about the senses of natural kind terms. Rather than refuting the internalist and rationalist theories of meaning, the arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke are best recast as refutations of their own Fregean assumptions. The paper also shows how autonomous notions of sense and analyticity enable us to reconstruct such theories, formulate an internalist/ rationalist account of semantic knowledge, and preserve Donnellan's, Putnam's, and Kripke's insights about reference.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
145 (#85,022)

6 months
1 (#413,813)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 190-213.
In Defense of Definitions.David Pitt - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):139-156.
The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Gillian Russell - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):712–729.
Truth in Virtue of Meaning.Arthur Sullivan - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 373-397.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references