Contemporary philosophy standardly accepts Frege's conceptions of sense as the
determiner of reference and of analyticity as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning.
This paper argues that those conceptions are mistaken. It develops referentially
autonomous notions of sense and analyticity and applies them to the semantics of natural
kind terms. The arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke concerning natural kind
terms are widely taken to refute internalist and rationalist theories of meaning. This
paper shows that the counter-intuitive consequences about the reference of natural kind
terms depend as much on Frege's conceptions of sense and analyticity as on what such
theories of meaning say about the senses of natural kind terms. Rather than refuting the
internalist and rationalist theories of meaning, the arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and
Kripke are best recast as refutations of their own Fregean assumptions. The paper also
shows how autonomous notions of sense and analyticity enable us to reconstruct such
theories, formulate an internalist/ rationalist account of semantic knowledge, and
preserve Donnellan's, Putnam's, and Kripke's insights about reference.