Abstract

Can human rights be defended against the persistent charges that they are culturally relative or ethnocentrically tied to only the philosophical commitments of the modern West? This thesis considers how human rights might be justified in light of a growing acceptance of multiculturalism, and suspicion regarding universalist approaches in ethics. In particular, it examines the increasingly popular strategy today of defending human rights on the least controversial premises possible, thereby undercutting the need for any particular metaphysics, religious tenet, account of human nature, or other partisan view. I offer a sympathetic but critical engagement with three such "minimalist strategies of justification," and suggest a fourth alternative that stands apart from, even though it is informed by, these three positions. ;Chapter One demonstrates how two common objections against the universality of human rights---the cultural relativist and ethnocentric theses---do not philosophically devastate. Chapter Two considers John Rawls' political constructivist account of "human rights proper," and acknowledges both its inadequacies when compared to international law, and betrayal of some basic liberal convictions for which he is most well-known. Chapter Three assesses several consensus-based approaches to human rights, and concludes that cross-cultural convergence on their norms may be necessary to and important for other purposes, but cannot exhaust the issue of justification on its own. More promising is Nussbaum's universalistic "capabilities approach" to human rights. Chapter Four finds her neo-Aristotelian defense of universal norms with sensitivity to difference to be generally workable, but gives notice of some internal tensions to which she must attend. It is affirmed in Chapter Five that these and other strategies of minimalism positively contribute to our understanding of what human rights justification must entail, though cannot fully evade the types of controversy they were hoping to circumvent altogether. It is concluded that belief in human rights requires certain substantive assumptions to which minimalists are already committed, though in many cases seek to marginalize or downplay their importance.