How untidy is God's mind? A note on the dynamical implications of Nancy Cartwright's metaphysics

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):549-553 (1993)
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Abstract

One of the points of principle made by Cartwright is that the fundamental laws do not describe reality because they are always employed together with ceteris paribus clauses, the implication being that ceteris paribus assumptions always have dire consequences. We here wish to offer a dynamical interpretation of ceteris paribus laws in terms of their stability or fragility. On this interpretation, the consequences of ceteris paribus assumptions become concretely dependent on the nature of the laws under consideration and cannot be decided in a blanket fashion a priori. Using insights from nonlinear dynamical systems theory, we shall put forward the idea that any assumption of the general validity or invalidity of ceteris paribus laws amounts to a stability or fragility assumption, respectively. We shall then argue that it is in certain cases possible to relativise the consequences of ceteris paribus assumptions in a concrete way. We shall also indicate briefly how the same principle applies to Cartwright's arguments concerning composition of causes and approximations. Overall, our intention is to suggest a framework within which Cartwright's intuitions about the fundamental laws of physics could be grounded.

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Citations of this work

Stability in Cosmology, from Einstein to Inflation.C. D. McCoy - 2020 - In Claus Beisbart, Tilman Sauer & Christian Wüthrich (eds.), Thinking About Space and Time: 100 Years of Applying and Interpreting General Relativity. Cham: Birkhäuser. pp. 71-89.

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References found in this work

How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
How the Laws of Physics Lie.Malcolm R. Forster - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):478-480.
Fragility and deterministic modelling in the exact sciences.R. K. Tavakol - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):147-156.

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