Metaphysical Naturalism and Some Moral Realisms

Philo 14 (1):5-24 (2011)
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Abstract

One central question of metaethics concerns whether there are any moral facts. I argue that morality as such is characterized by a number of distinctive features, and that metaphysical naturalists should believe that there are moral facts only if there is a plausible naturalistic explanation of the existence of facts which exemplify those features. I survey three prominent (and very different) naturalistic moral theories—the reductive naturalism of Peter Railton, Frank Jackson’s analytic descriptivism, and Christine Korsgaard’s Kantianism—and argue that none of them has the resources to explain the existence of genuine moral facts.

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Matt Jordan
Ohio State University

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Moral Normativity: Naturalism vs. Theism.Ferhat Yöney - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93 (1):3-23.

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