Abstract

THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT EXPOSITION is to put forward an interpretation of Locke's and Hooker's conception of the finding of the law. The topics which will be examined are the knowledge and content of the different types of law and, above all, the standard of the good law. That Locke and Hooker used the same language, to a large extent, in treating the concept of law can be seen immediately in a comparison of Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature, Two Treatises on Government, and Essay on Human Understanding with the first book of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. This similarity facilitated Locke's recourse to Hooker's texts when he wanted to strengthen some of the arguments of the Second Treatise. But is the use of similar language not deceptive in the present case? Do terms used in 1690 intend the same meaning as they did when used in 1660? After nearly four decades of conflicting interpretations of Locke's political and philosophical texts, one can hardly expect to offer a new answer. This analysis will explore the similarity within the framework of a traditional, natural law interpretation of Locke. We shall find that, in Hooker's Laws and Locke's Two Treatises, we are faced with the same pattern of exposition concerning natural law and its source. Following this path of inquiry represents a decision to put aside, for the time being, the influential but highly problematic suggestion that Locke wished to deceive his readers in the exposition of some of the most central parts of his political theory.