Folk taxonomies and folk theories: The case of Williams syndrome

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):578-579 (1998)

Abstract

Work with people with Williams syndrome is reviewed relative to Atran's claim that the universality of taxonomic rank in the animal and plant domains derives from a biological construal of generic species. From this work it is argued that a biological construal of animals is not necessary for the construction of the adult taxonomy of animals and therefore that the existence of an animal (or plant) taxonomy cannot be taken as evidence of a biological domain.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,879

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
39 (#295,576)

6 months
1 (#386,016)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Taxonomic Ranks, Generic Species, and Core Memes.Scott Atran - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):593-604.
Are Folk Taxonomies “Memes”?Dan Sperber - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):589-590.
Atran’s Unnatural Kinds.David Davies - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):345-357.
Faculty Before Folk.Justin Leiber - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):579-580.
Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 191--209.